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CYBERSECURITY: DOMESTIC AND 
LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
SEAN SHANK*
Despite the prominence of  the health care and stimulus debates throughout the fi rst years of  
the Obama administration, political affairs in Washington, D.C. have quietly yielded major develop-
ments in efforts to secure cyberspace.  Exercises by the Bipartisan Policy Center,1 the establishment 
and appointment of  a new cybersecurity coordinator for the White House,2 and pending legislation3 
indicate that cyber security issues comprise an area of  growing concern.  Some experts, including 
former Director of  National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell, view American electronic infra-
structure as an area ripe for exploitation by terrorists,4 while other experts rightly indicate that such 
infrastructure is already subject to exploitation.5 Attempting to address this concern, various bills, es-
pecially the Senate Homeland Security Committee’s “Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act” 
*     Sean Shank is a 2011 JD/MA candidate at American University – Washington College of  Law.  For his joint degree 
program he is concentrating on national security law, cybersecurity, and nuclear non-proliferation.  He earned an A.B. 
from Princeton University in East Asian Studies and is fl uent in Japanese.
1  See Cyber ShockWave Shows U.S. Unprepared For Cyber Threats, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, Feb. 17, 2010, [hereinafter 
Cyber ShockWave] available at http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/news/press-releases/2010/02/cyber-shockwave-shows-
us-unprepared-cyber-threats (discussing the potential weaknesses of  a government counterterror response based on a 
simulated cyberattack).  
2  See Macon Phillips, Introducing the New Cybersecurity Coordinator, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (December 22, 2009, 7:30 
AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/22/introducing-new-cybersecurity-coordinator (announcing Howard 
Schmidt’s selection as White House Cybersecurity Coordinator).  
3  See Eric Chabrow, Infosec Provisions Seen as Rider to Senate Defense Bill, GOVINFO SECURITY, August 25, 2010, available at 
http://www.govinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id=2868 (describing potential efforts to attach cybersecurity legislation 
to the National Defense Authorization Act, as well as efforts by Senate leadership to combine various competing 
cybersecurity bills into one omnibus bill).  
4  See Mike McConnell, Mike McConnell on How to Win the Cyber-War We’re Losing, WASH. POST, February 28, 
2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502493.
html? sid=ST2010031901063 (discussing insuffi cient protection for, inter alia, power grids, transportation, and 
telecommunications networks).  
5  See, e.g. Siobhan Gorman, Grid is Vulnerable to Cyber-Attacks, WALL ST. J., August 3, 2010, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748704905004575405741051458382.html (indicating the threat from 
ongoing Russian and Chinese electronic surveillance of  U.S. energy grid).
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(PCNAA)6, have infl amed concerns about granting the White House internet “kill switch” authority.7 
Broadly stated, this authority would give the White House the ability to shut off  parts of  the inter-
net subjected to sophisticated hacking, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)8, or other attacks.  
These concerns warrant a number of  questions, including:  would an internet kill switch pose 
a threat to private enterprise or civil liberties?  If  legislation did, in fact, provide the President with 
the ability to “shut off ” the internet, does this accord with his legal and constitutional authority?9  
Even if  this authority passes constitutional muster, is a kill switch technically sound?10  Bills such as 
PCNAA and Senator Jay Rockefeller’s Cybersecurity Act of  2010 (introduced in 2009)11 assign the 
White House and other Executive Branch agencies with new responsibilities that attempt to address 
such technical concerns by granting the White House considerable emergency authority in monitor-
ing and operating the internet. The Rockefeller Bill would convert the Department of  Commerce 
into a clearing-house of  industry network security information12, while under PCNAA, the White 
House and the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) would have considerable power over the 
internet in the event of  an emergency.  Private business would be required to abide by emergency 
executive orders upon an indication that an emergency existed.13  
Even if  the White House has the legal authority for a kill switch operation, the viability of  such 
a measure could actually be more of  a technical problem than a Constitutional one.  If  the United 
States’ critical infrastructure were subjected to a devastating cyberattack, it might be reasonable to 
grant the President aggressive authority to commandeerU.S. networks.  It is now a truism that the 
Executive Branch’s war and national security powers have expanded in the wake of  9/11 — for such 
power to be available in the arena of  cybersecurity is neither surprising nor inappropriate.  Perhaps it 
is even less surprising, given the concern that a continually vulnerable electronic infrastructure could 
serve as the staging ground for the next 9/11.  Due to the growing sophistication of  certain hackers, 
attribution is diffi cult, and routine internet use can result in unwittingly exposing one’s computer to 
6  Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of  2010, S. 3480, 111th Cong. (2010).  
7  See Adam Cohen, What’s Missing in the Internet Kill-Switch Debate, TIME MAGAZINE, August 11, 2010, available at http://
www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2009758,00.html?xid=rss-mostpopular (describing ideologically diverse 
opposition to enhanced White House control over the internet for security purposes).  
8 A DDoS attack is one in which a master computer may control a botnet, or series of  compromised computers, to 
direct inordinate amounts of  traffi c to a website so as to make it unavailable.
9 In addition to the Executive Branch’s constitutional authority, some commentators indicate that the Communications 
act of  1934 also provides the White House with the authority it would need to control the internet in the event of  an 
emergency.  See id. (indicating that the President “already has broad power under the Communications Act of  1934 to 
shut down wire communications . . . includ[ing] the internet”); see also Communications Act of  1934 (codifi ed at 47 
U.S.C.S. § 606(d)(2) (LexisNexis 2010)) (granting the President the authority to “cause the closing of  any facility or 
station for wire communication and the removal therefrom of  its apparatus and equipment”).  
10 See The Fear-Based Psychology of  the ‘Internet Kill Switch,’ TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, August 18, 2010, available at http://www.
technologyreview.com/blog/mimssbits/25628/ (in which interviewee Paul Kocher describes the kill switch as a “blunt 
weapon” and questions the benefi t of  its implementation).  
11 Cybersecurity Act of  2010, S.773, 111th Cong. (2009).
12 Id. § 14(a) (referring to private sector network vulnerabilities).
13 S. 3480 § 249(a)(1).  
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an unlawful botnet.14  In short, the risks are many, but combating them through legislation must be 
carried out with an eye for technical limitations. 
CYBERSECURITY ABROAD: CHALLENGES, CONFLICTS, AND A NEED FOR LEGAL NORMS
When viewed in an international legal context, the term “cybersecurity” may suggest a broader, 
more inchoate meaning.  “Cybersecurity” not only encompasses matters involving DDoS attacks 
from isolated hackers, but can also include emerging aspects of  state-to-state warfare, as well as 
questions about whether access to electronic information should be deemed a human right. 15  In cer-
tain contexts, U.S. foreign policy refl ects an intersection of  security and human rights concerns — 
while members of  the legislature cite to the cyber-threat posed by China16, members of  the Execu-
tive Branch laud U.S. efforts to disrupt authoritarian controls on internet activities by human rights 
activists.17  There are many threats that warrant U.S. involvement, even if  international law does not 
always provide suffi cient guidance in all contexts. 
In its summer 2008 confl ict with Georgia, Russia accompanied its military incursions with cy-
berattacks on Georgian computer systems.18  Russian state hackers, and independent hackers within 
Russia have long been suspected as sources of  other cyberattacks against foreign states, including 
the crippling 2007 DDoS attacks against Estonia.  These attacks against “eStonia” (nicknamed for its 
well-developed domestic internet access19) continued for over a month as an extended “cyber-riot,” 
threatening Estonian electronic infrastructure, including its banking system.20  However, unlike the 
2008 attacks on Georgian computer networks, it is unclear how responsible the Russian government, 
or any other party, was for the 2007 “Web War I” against Estonia.  Even for analysts and agencies 
that have robust resources, attribution is a technological problem — making legal determination of  
state responsibility even more diffi cult.21 
China is a prominent example of  how freedom of  access to information, cybersecurity, and 
14 See FTC Consumer Alert: Botnets and Hackers and Spam (Oh, My!), F. T. C., June 2007, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt132.shtm. 
15  See Hillary Clinton, Secretary of  State, Remarks on Internet Freedom at Newseum, (January 21, 2010) (transcript 
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm) (discussing a “universal right to come together 
with those who share your values . . .”).
16  See Chloe Albanesius, Lieberman Backs Away from ‘Internet Kill Switch’, PCMAG.COM, June 21, 2010, http://www.
pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2365393,00.asp. 
17  See Clinton supra note 15. 
18  Kevin Coleman, Cyber War 2.0 – Russia v. Georgia, Defense Tech, available at http://defensetech.org/2008/08/13/
cyber-war-2-0-russia-v-georgia. 
19  90% of  Estonia’s banking, at a minimum, is internet-based.  Elections are also conducted via the internet. See  
Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED MAGAZINE, August 21, 2007, available at http://
www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia?currentPage=all. 
20  See Shaun Waterman, Analysis: Who Cyber Smacked Estonia?, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, June 11, 2007, available 
at http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2007/06/11/Analysis-Who-cyber-smacked-Estonia/UPI-
26831181580439/ (describing Professor James Hendler’s characterization of  the attacks as more of  a “cyber riot”).    
21   See Scott Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 192, 231–36 (2009). 
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American foreign policy are entangled.  In a January 2010 speech, Secretary of  State Hillary Clinton 
praised U.S. efforts to assist human rights dissidents in China with their bypass of  network restric-
tions put in place by the Chinese government.22  Soon after Clinton’s speech, Harvard Law Professor 
Jack Goldsmith criticized what he viewed as the Administration’s hypocrisy:  how could the State 
Department support the disruption of  another state’s internet regulations on one hand while prais-
ing the rule of  law on the other?23  Though Professor Goldsmith’s compelling criticism suggests 
inconsistency, this problem could be resolved by a continued U.S. commitment to norms in support 
of  universal access to information and electronic free speech.  While this is easier said than done, the 
benefi ts of  more legal principles against restrictions on information and democratic speech could be 
considerable.24
Similar to China, Iran poses challenges to the United States in both the physical and electronic 
worlds.  Following the questionable election results of  2009, reformist youths made every effort 
to organize and communicate their message through social media.  Doing so meant that protesters 
not only opposed their government in the streets; reformist youths also challenged governmental 
restrictions on access to such media, including Twitter.25  Internet and phone connection speeds 
were purposely slowed to a dysfunctional level, so as to disable Green Movement supporters from 
uploading photos, video, and other information about what was actually happening on the ground.  
Such internet restriction, combined with reporters’ inability to cover the election aftermath, left 
ordinary Iranians unable to disseminate the vital understanding of  the Iranian situation other then 
what the regime wanted to communicate.  This assertion of  internet speech control in Iran stands 
in stark contrast with U.S. internet freedoms which are not as limited, despite the potential security 
vulnerabilities. This internet freedom is viewed by many as a critical tool for democratic interests 
internationally.26
Generally, America’s increasing reliance on technology provides its enemies with new targets.  
Because infrastructure targets are extensive and the potential culprits similarly numerous, properly 
attributing these attacks is diffi cult and poses a problem for the establishment of  a legal bright-line 
standard.  For the law to be applied to a state or other culprit, the law and its defi nitions must ac-
count for material matters of  technology.  If  there is an undeveloped or incorrect understanding 
of  the internet’s structure, measures like an internet kill switch and passionate words in support of  
online freedom of  speech may provide little benefi t.   However, if  legislation, policies, and interna-
tional legal norms are structured on an understanding of  the diffuse nature of  the internet, it may be 
possible to address the threats briefl y discussed above.  
22  See Clinton supra note 15. 
23  Jack Goldsmith, Can We Stop the Global Cyber Arms Race?, WASH. POST, February 1, 2010, available at  http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/31/AR2010013101834.html.
24  See Shackelford, supra note 19.
25  Lev Grossman, Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of  the Movement, TIME MAGAZINE, June 17, 2009, available at http://
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html. 
26  See Clinton supra note 15 (“. . . online organizing has been a critical tool for advancing democracy and enabling 
citizens to protest suspicious election results . . .”).
